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Bill C-22 and the Backdoor Problem: Why Police Surveillance Tools Never Stay With Police

By ·November 17, 2026·14 min read

When Meta Threatens to Leave, Pay Attention

On November 16, 2026, Meta told a Senate committee in Ottawa that it may pull WhatsApp and other encrypted services out of Canada if Bill C-22 passes without further changes. Signal has issued a similar warning. Apple has said the amended bill still puts its privacy and security features at risk.

When the world’s largest social media company, a non-profit privacy app and Apple all say the same thing, Canadians should listen. Their objection is not about profit. It is about a simple technical reality: you cannot build a door into a secure system that only the good guys can open.

As criminal defence lawyers, we see every day how investigative powers are actually used, not how they are described in a press release. This post explains what Bill C-22 does, why the technology it calls for is dangerous, and why history tells us that tools built for police rarely stay in police hands.

What Bill C-22 Actually Does

Bill C-22, the Lawful Access Act, 2026, was tabled on March 12, 2026. It passed the House of Commons on June 18 and is now before the Senate’s National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs Committee. It is not law yet, and none of it is in force.

The bill has two parts:

  • Part 1 – new police powers. It amends the Criminal Code and the CSIS Act to create new orders for “subscriber information” (who is behind an account or device) that can be served on anyone who provides services to the public. Some of these orders run on the lower “reasonable suspicion” standard rather than reasonable and probable grounds.
  • Part 2 – the Supporting Authorized Access to Information Act. This is the part the tech companies are fighting. It requires “core providers” (large telecoms and similar carriers) to build and maintain interception capabilities. It also lets the federal Minister of Public Safety issue confidential orders requiring any electronic service provider, including messaging apps, to build specific surveillance capabilities into its systems. Those orders need the Intelligence Commissioner’s approval and last up to two years.
  • Metadata retention. Regulations can require core providers to keep records of who you contacted, when, and from where, for every customer, whether or not they are suspected of anything. The original bill allowed a full year; amendments cut it to six months.
  • Secrecy. Orders can come with non-disclosure requirements, so the public may never learn what a company was compelled to build.

The government says the bill does not require “backdoors.” After criticism in the spring, it added language saying providers cannot be forced to introduce a “systemic vulnerability” or to decrypt data unless they supplied the encryption and hold the key.

Critics, including Meta, Signal, the Canadian Bar Association, the Citizen Lab and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, say those protections are too narrow. Meta says the amendments protect the core of encryption but leave other layers exposed. Several key terms, including “encryption” itself, are left to be defined later by regulation.

Why “Lawful Access” Is a Dangerous Idea

The government’s position is that Bill C-22 only requires companies to help police get information they are already legally entitled to. The problem is not the warrant. The problem is the machinery the bill requires companies to build and keep running.

  • There is no such thing as a door only police can use. An interception capability is a weakness built into a system on purpose. Software does not check whether the person using that weakness has a warrant. If a capability exists, it can be found, stolen, abused by an insider, or exploited by a foreign government. Security experts have made this point for decades, and real-world breaches (described below) have proven them right.
  • A six-month stockpile of everyone’s data is a target. Mandatory metadata retention means telecoms must keep records of who every customer called, texted or connected with, when, and from where. Most of those customers will never be suspected of anything. That database becomes one of the most valuable targets in the country for hackers, foreign spies, stalkers and fraudsters.
  • Secrecy breeds abuse. Ministerial orders under Part 2 can be confidential, with broad non-disclosure requirements. Canadians may never know what their phone carrier or messaging app was ordered to build. As the Stingray history below shows, secret tools are tools that escape scrutiny, including scrutiny by the courts.
  • The safeguards are narrower than they look. The bill bars orders that create a “systemic vulnerability,” but the definition is tied to technical standards and carves out flaws that expose only a target’s data. Key terms are left to future regulations. The Canadian Bar Association has called for a broader definition and an outright ban on any obligation to undermine encryption.
  • Canadians could end up less safe, not more. If WhatsApp and Signal leave, millions of Canadians lose two of the most secure communication tools available. We have seen this before. In the UK, a secret government order under similar powers led Apple to withdraw its strongest iCloud encryption from British users altogether.

Built for Police, Copied by Everyone: The Stingray Story

The best case study is the cell-site simulator, better known by the brand name “StingRay,” sold by Harris Corporation to police and federal agencies. The device pretends to be a cell tower. Every phone nearby connects to it, revealing its identity and location, and older models could intercept calls and texts.

For years, the technology was shrouded in secrecy:

  • In 2015, a Baltimore detective testified that his department had used Stingray-type devices about 4,300 times since 2007, often without telling judges or prosecutors. A non-disclosure agreement with the FBI instructed prosecutors to drop cases rather than reveal how the device worked. Lawyers later reviewed hundreds of convictions.
  • In Canada, the RCMP refused for years to confirm it owned the devices. It finally admitted their use in April 2017. A later report by the federal Privacy Commissioner found the RCMP used them in 125 criminal investigations between 2011 and 2016, including six where no warrant was obtained.
  • The RCMP’s admission came only after a CBC/Radio-Canada investigation detected IMSI catchers operating near Parliament Hill, the U.S. and Israeli embassies, and Montreal’s Trudeau airport. The federal government confirmed those devices did not belong to any Canadian agency. Nobody could say whether they belonged to a foreign intelligence service or organized crime. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security reported the same thing in Washington, D.C. in 2018.

Then the technology escaped entirely. A device that once cost police tens of thousands of dollars can now be approximated by hobbyists. In 2018, a Motherboard reporter built a basic IMSI catcher with a $20 software-defined radio from Amazon, a laptop, and free code from GitHub. Online tutorials walk anyone through the process.

In April 2026, that threat arrived in Canada in a new form. Toronto Police arrested three men in “Project Lighthouse,” the country’s first known “SMS blaster” case. Police allege the men drove a fake cell tower around the Greater Toronto Area in a vehicle, pulling tens of thousands of phones off legitimate networks and blasting them with texts impersonating banks and government agencies. Police recorded more than 13 million network disruptions, and say the device could briefly cut phones off from 911.

In under two decades, a secret police tool became a criminal’s fraud machine. That is the pattern Canadians should keep in mind when evaluating Bill C-22.

Licence Plate Readers: When the Watchers Go Rogue

Automated licence plate readers (ALPRs) are cameras that photograph every passing vehicle and log its plate, time and location. Police sell them to the public as a way to find stolen cars and abducted children. In the United States, one company, Flock Safety, has linked thousands of these cameras into searchable networks. The results are a warning:

  • Stalking by police. A Washington Post analysis published in 2026 found at least 50 U.S. officers charged or accused of using plate readers for unauthorized purposes, including stalking women. A Kechi, Kansas police lieutenant pleaded guilty in 2023 after using a neighbouring city’s Flock system to track his estranged wife. A police chief in nearby Sedgwick reportedly ran his ex-girlfriend’s plate 164 times (and her new boyfriend’s vehicle 64 times) before resigning. A police chief in Braselton, Georgia was arrested in 2025 for allegedly using plate readers to stalk and harass several people.
  • Policing what’s legal elsewhere. In 2025, a Texas sheriff’s office searched more than 83,000 Flock cameras across the country, including in states where abortion is legal, looking for a woman who had self-managed an abortion. The search log read: “had an abortion, search for female.” The sheriff claimed it was a welfare check. Records later obtained by the Electronic Frontier Foundation showed deputies were running a death investigation.
  • Data flowing to agencies with no contract. Public records showed more than 4,000 lookups between June 2024 and May 2025 in which local police searched Flock data for immigration-related reasons, often as informal favours to federal agents who had no direct access.

None of these systems was sold as a tool for stalking ex-partners or tracking people across state lines. Each was sold as a crime-fighting tool. Once the data existed, it was used for whatever the person at the keyboard wanted.

More Examples: Law Enforcement Tools That Got Away

The pattern repeats across technologies and countries, including here at home:

  • Clearview AI (Canada). The RCMP initially told the Privacy Commissioner it was not using Clearview AI’s facial recognition software. It admitted using it only after Clearview’s client list was hacked and leaked. In 2021, the Commissioner found the RCMP broke the Privacy Act by using a database built from billions of photos scraped from the internet without consent. Officers with the Calgary Police Service were also caught using Clearview AI in early 2020.
  • Pegasus spyware. NSO Group sold Pegasus only to governments, for use against terrorism and serious crime. Researchers at the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab and others have documented its use against journalists, lawyers, human rights activists and political dissidents around the world.
  • The NSA’s EternalBlue. The U.S. National Security Agency kept a Windows flaw secret for years so it could use it as a hacking tool. In 2017, a group called the Shadow Brokers stole and leaked it. Within weeks it powered the WannaCry and NotPetya attacks, which shut down hospitals and shipping companies and caused billions of dollars in damage worldwide.
  • Rogue Stingrays in the capital. As noted above, IMSI catchers were detected near Parliament Hill and Montreal’s airport, and they belonged to no Canadian agency.

From Police Backdoor to National Security Breach

We do not have to guess what happens when a country forces its telecom networks to build in wiretap capability. It has already happened, twice on a massive scale.

  • The Athens Affair (2004–05). Ericsson phone switches used by Vodafone Greece contained built-in “lawful intercept” functions designed for police wiretaps. Unknown attackers secretly switched them on and used them to tap more than 100 phones, including those of the Greek Prime Minister, cabinet ministers, senior military and police officials, journalists and activists. The tapping ran for months around the Athens Olympics before it was discovered.
  • Salt Typhoon (2024 to present). In October 2024, it was revealed that a Chinese state-backed hacking group had broken into major U.S. carriers including AT&T, Verizon and Lumen. Among the systems they reached were the ones those carriers use to carry out court-ordered wiretaps, built to comply with a 1994 U.S. law, CALEA, that requires carriers to make their networks wiretap-ready. The FBI has since notified hundreds of organizations about the campaign, and its victims have grown to include carriers around the world.

In both cases, the attackers did not need to invent a way in. The government had already required one. That is exactly the kind of infrastructure Part 2 of Bill C-22 would require Canadian carriers to build and maintain.

The fraud risk follows the same path. The Toronto SMS blaster case shows how quickly criminals adopt surveillance-grade technology once it becomes available. A mandated interception system, or a six-month database of every Canadian’s call and location records, is a far bigger prize than a fake cell tower in a car trunk. Once breached or leaked, it could fuel identity theft, SIM-swap fraud, extortion and targeted scams for years.

What This Means for Canadians, and for the Accused

The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly recognized that Canadians have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their digital information. In R. v. Spencer (2014), the Court held that police generally need judicial authorization to link a person’s identity to their internet activity. In R. v. Bykovets (2024), it held the same for IP addresses. Part 1 of Bill C-22 appears to be, in part, a legislative response to those decisions. The Canadian Bar Association has warned that the expanded powers could violate Charter rights.

From where we sit, secrecy is the biggest concern. Our clients’ right to make full answer and defence depends on knowing how the evidence against them was gathered. If an investigation relies on a capability that a company was secretly ordered to build, the accused may never learn it exists, let alone be able to test whether it was lawful or reliable. The FBI’s Stingray agreements, which told prosecutors to drop cases rather than explain the technology, show where that road leads.

None of this means police should have no tools. Serious crime increasingly happens online, and investigators need lawful, targeted ways to gather evidence. But every new capability should be judged by a simple question: what happens when it falls into the wrong hands? History says it eventually will.

Bill C-22 is still before the Senate. The National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs Committee can recommend amendments, which would send the bill back to the House of Commons. Canadians who are concerned can contact their senators while there is still time to shape the law.

If you have been charged with an offence and the evidence involves phone records, location data, licence plate readers, or other digital surveillance, contact Hoare Claxton Criminal Defence. This post is general information only and is not legal advice.

Sources

Bill C-22 and the Meta story

Stingrays and SMS blasters

Licence plate readers

Other examples

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